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Ana Santos Rutschman*
I. INTRODUCTION
We find ourselves at a momentous turn in the history of vaccines. The COVID19 pandemic triggered a quasi-global vaccine race that not only compressed vaccine
research and development timelines, but also paved the way for the administration
of a new type of vaccine technology—mRNA vaccines, which work in substantially
different ways from the vaccines in use before the pandemic.1
While the process of bringing emerging COVID-19 vaccines to market has
taken place in an unusually short timeframe,2 it was largely predicated on the same
scientific and regulatory processes that govern the development, approval and
deployment of other new vaccines. For decades, these processes have encompassed
several phases of vaccine testing—first without and subsequently with the
involvement of human subjects3—followed by an analysis of the emerging data.4
This Article reflects on the evolution and status quo of the ways in which these
data are gathered and disseminated within the context of the development of new
vaccines. It treats information stemming from clinical trials as the initial building
blocks of our vaccine data infrastructure, and surveys problems related to data
collection and disclosure that have long been pervasive in the vaccine research and
development ecosystem.
*

© 2021 Ana Santos Rutschman. Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University School
of Law, Center for Health Law Studies. S.J.D., Duke Law School. I thank the organizers of
the 2020 Lee E. Teitelbaum Utah Law Review Symposium on the law and ethics of medical
research for the invitation to participate and develop this writing project, as well as
participants in the panel on clinical trials and legal and ethical issues in the age of COVID19. I also thank Jesse Goldner, Sidney Watson and Ruqaiijah Yearby for comments on early
versions of the Article, and Cheryl Cooper, Kaena Kao and Hannah Schweissguth for
research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Understanding and Explaining mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 24, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/covid19/hcp/mrna-vaccine-basics.html [https://perma.cc/53X7-HCTD] (describing the new type
of vaccine technology that emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic).
2
See, e.g., Will Brothers, A Timeline of COVID-19 Vaccine Development, BIOSPACE
(Dec.
3,
2020),
https://www.biospace.com/article/a-timeline-of-covid-19-vaccinedevelopment/ [https://perma.cc/HSG6-UJ32] (providing an overview of the compressed
timeline for the development of COVID-19 vaccine candidates).
3
See generally CARL H. COLEMAN, JERRY A. MENIKOFF, JESSE A. GOLDNER & NANCY
NEVELOFF DUBLER, THE ETHICS AND REGULATION OF RESEARCH WITH HUMAN SUBJECTS
(2005) (providing a brief history of the use of human subjects in vaccine research and
development).
4
See generally HARRY M. MARKS, THE PROGRESS OF EXPERIMENT: SCIENCE AND
THERAPEUTIC REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES, 1900–1990 (1997) (providing a historical
overview of clinical trials in the United States throughout the twentieth century).
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Part II of this Article situates the discussion of vaccine clinical trial data within
historical boundaries. Section II.A travels back in time to the polio vaccine trials of
the 1950s in the United States, which were one of the main catalysts of the adoption
of the clinical trial structure now in place throughout the world. Section II.B then
charts the formalization of the modern vaccine clinical trial model through
legislation adopted between the polio and the COVID-19 vaccine races.
Even though this formalization has resulted in a seemingly robust legal
framework, there remain multiple problems that affect both the ways in which
vaccine clinical trial data are actually generated and then utilized. Using examples
from both past vaccine clinical trials and the COVID-19 vaccine race, Section III.A
focuses on data collection issues, with an emphasis on the under-representation of
minority populations in vaccine clinical trials. Section III.B then considers how
imperfectly generated data meet further roadblocks in the form of delayed reporting
or lack of reporting of clinical trial results, as well as restrictions to data sharing
often attributable to agency interpretations of trade secrecy provisions that have long
been disputed by several legal scholars.5
These problems affect both the transparency and accountability of vaccine
innovation processes and pose significant hurdles to subsequent research and
development. They can also impair public trust in vaccine innovation processes at a
time in which vaccine misinformation is quickly eroding overall levels of trust in
vaccination as a public health tool.6 Part IV concludes this Article by pointing
towards emerging ways to enrich the existing vaccine clinical trial data
infrastructure. Specifically, it provides a short case study on the COVID-19 data
sharing policy implemented in the European Union by its counterpart to the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration, the European Medicines Agency. This ad hoc policy
quickly expanded the disclosure of information about emerging COVID-19 drugs
and vaccines in response to mounting pressure for more transparency about the drug
and vaccine approval process. As such, it may be used as a blueprint by regulators
elsewhere, as well as by proponents of a more robust system for the disclosure and
sharing of clinical trial data.

5

See infra notes 183–85 and accompanying text.
See Alexandre de Figueiredo, Clarissa Simas, Emilie Karafillakis, Pauline Paterson
& Heidi J. Larson, Mapping Global Trends in Vaccine Confidence and Investigating
Barriers to Vaccine Uptake: A Large-Scale Retrospective Temporal Modelling Study, 396
LANCET 898, 907 (2020), https://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS01406736(20)31558-0/fulltext [https://perma.cc/WS9Z-YZAV].
6
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II. VACCINE CLINICAL TRIALS AND DATA INFRASTRUCTURE:
A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. The Polio Vaccine and the Origins of Modern Clinical Trials
April 26, 1954. Franklin Sherman Elementary School in McLean, Virginia.
This date and place marked the beginning of the field trials7 for the polio
vaccine candidate developed by Jonas Salk.8 This was a momentous occasion in the
history of vaccinology. Called the largest experiment in public health to date, these
trials encapsulated the evolution of vaccine research, development and testing.9
Poliomyelitis—a compound word bringing together the Greek for gray (polios)
and marrow (myelos) with the Latin suffix used to denote inflammation (itis)10—is
a highly contagious infectious disease transmitted by the poliovirus.11 While 90% of
people who contract the disease experience mild symptoms like fatigue or fever, or
no symptoms at all, the virus causes paralysis in the remaining 10% of the patient
population.12 Affecting most commonly the legs,13 paralysis is permanent in most
cases, and 5% to 10% of paralyzed patients die.14 The disease primarily affects
children under the age of five,15 and before a vaccine was developed—and the

7

Vaccine field trials are tests typically conducted in multiple sites across one or several
countries in order to assess the performance of an experimental pharmaceutical or
biopharmaceutical product. See W. Charles Cockburn, Field Trials in the Evaluation of
Vaccines, 47 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 819, 824 (1957).
8
See DAVID M. OSHINSKY, POLIO: AN AMERICAN STORY 3–6 (2005) (recounting Salk’s
development of a killed-virus vaccine and supervision of the Salk Vaccine Trials of 1954).
9
Paul Meier, The Biggest Public Health Experiment Ever: The 1954 Field Trial of the
Salk Poliomyelitis Vaccine, in STATISTICS: A GUIDE TO THE UNKNOWN (Judith M. Tanur et
al. eds., 1972), https://www.medicine.mcgill.ca/epidemiology/hanley/c622/salk trial.pdf
[https://perma.cc/35YA-LXL5].
10
OSHINSKY, supra note 8, at 9.
11
Poliomyelitis (Polio): Overview, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/healthtopics/poliomyelitis#tab=tab_1 [https://perma.cc/Y2TH-5WBF] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
12
Poliomyelitis (Polio): Symptoms, WORLD HEALTH ORG., https://www.who.int/health
-topics/poliomyelitis#tab=tab_2 [https://perma.cc/M4RT-MYWK] (last visited Jan. 28,
2021).
13
See, e.g., Amy Berish, FDR and Polio, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL
LIBR. & MUSEUM, https://www.fdrlibrary.org/polio [https://perma.cc/R8UY-E9PT] (last
visited Jan. 28, 2021) (describing President Roosevelt’s lower limb paralysis after
contracting polio at the relatively late age of thirty-nine).
14
Poliomyelitis (Polio): Symptoms, supra note 12.
15
Poliomyelitis: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (July 22, 2019), https://www.who.
int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/poliomyelitis [https://perma.cc/YHU3-5MWT].
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disease incidence reduced by 99%16—polio outbreaks struck fear, especially among
parents of young children.17
The 1950s brought about a series of scientific breakthroughs that eventually
resulted in two foundational vaccines becoming available in the United States and
then abroad.18 Building on recent work on the poliovirus,19 the research teams of
Hilary Koprowski, Albert Sabin, and Jonas Salk developed different types of polio
vaccine candidates.20 Salk’s vaccine using a killed virus was the first one to be
licensed,21 following the largest human trials for any medical product up to that point
in history.22
The 1954–55 trials of the Salk vaccine were sponsored by the National
Foundation for Infantile Paralysis,23 now known as March of Dimes,24 and are

16

See Does Polio Still Exist? Is It Curable?, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 20, 2020),
https://www.who.int/news-room/q-a-detail/does-polio-still-exist-is-it-curable [https://perma
.cc/W87Q-26A5]. See generally THOMAS ABRAHAM, POLIO: THE ODYSSEY OF ERADICATION
(2018). But see Anna N. Chard, S. Deblina Datta, Graham Tallis, Cara C. Burns, Steven G.F.
Wassilak, John F. Vertefeuille & Michel Zaffran, Progress Toward Polio Eradication —
Worldwide, January 2018–March 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 784,
784–89 (2020), https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/69/wr/mm6925a4.htm [https://perma.
cc/2SZV-WJNN] (documenting increases in polio outbreaks and disruption in surveillance
and immunization activities due to the COVID-19 pandemic).
17
See Volker Janssen, When Polio Triggered Fear and Panic Among Parents in the
1950s, HISTORY (Apr. 2, 2020), https://www.history.com/news/polio-fear-post-wwii-era
[https://perma.cc/R54E-CM33]; Polio Elimination in the United States, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 25, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/polio/what-is-polio/polious.html [https://perma.cc/9RDH-2CEZ]; cf. PHILIP ROTH, NEMESIS (2010) (presenting a
fictional portrayal of widespread parental fear during polio outbreaks in summertime).
18
See generally OSHINSKY, supra note 8 (describing the polio vaccine race).
19
See generally Hans J. Eggers, Milestones in Early Poliomyelitis Research (1840 to
1949), 73 J. VIROLogy 4533 (1999), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1124
92/ [https://perma.cc/UL32-SZRK] (providing an overview of the research that enabled the
development of polio vaccines in the 1950s); John F. Enders, Thomas H. Weller & Frederick
C. Robbins, Cultivation of the Lansing Strain of Poliomyelitis Virus in Cultures of Various
Human Embryonic Tissues, 109 SCIENCE 85 (1949), https://science.sciencemag.org/content
/109/2822/85 [https://perma.cc/X2AZ-NQSL] (reporting the successful in vitro propagation
of the poliovirus).
20
OSHINSKY, supra note 8.
21
See Science and the Regulation of Biological Products, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Mar. 28, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/histories-product-regulation/science-andregulation-biological-products [https://perma.cc/BH8R-AZJ7].
22
See Meier, supra note 9; see also Marcia Meldrum, “A Calculated Risk”: The Salk
Polio Vaccine Field Trials of 1954, 317 BRITISH MED. J. 1233, 1233 (1998),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1114166/ [https://perma.cc/RG6A-4U4L].
23
Meldrum, supra note 22.
24
Who We Are, MARCH OF DIMES, https://www.marchofdimes.org/mission/who-weare.aspx [https://perma.cc/4C5E-R96A] (last visited Feb. 8, 2021).
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generally regarded as marking the beginning of modern clinical trials.25 The trials
focused on young children (first through third grade),26 and used a dual protocol,
with both placebo27 and observed controls in place.28 During the polio vaccine trials,
623,972 children participated in the placebo-controlled trial, in which some received
the vaccine candidate while others received a placebo.29 At the same time placebocontrolled trials were taking place, an even larger trial of the Salk vaccine unfolded,
in which over a million other children received the vaccine and no placebo was
administered.30
The results of these combined trials were announced in 1955, showing that the
Salk vaccine was 80% to 90% effective in generating protective immunity to polio.31
Broad administration of the Salk vaccine—and subsequently of other types of polio
vaccines32—led to a drastic reduction in the number of polio cases in the United
States and around the world.33 In 1979, polio was officially eliminated in the United
States.34 No cases have originated domestically since then, and the instances in
which travelers have brought the virus to the United States have been few and far
between, the last one occurring in 1993.35

25
See, e.g., Arnold S. Monto, Francis Field Trial of Inactivated Poliomyelitis Vaccine:
Background and Lessons for Today, 21 EPIDEMIOLOGICAL REVS. 7, 7 (1999) (listing the
characteristics of the 1954–55 polio vaccine trials that place them “squarely at the start of
the modern era” of clinical trials).
26
Meldrum, supra note 22.
27
Placebos are inert substances that do not produce a therapeutic effect. See generally
Usha Gupta & Menka Verma, Placebo in Clinical Trials, 4 PERSPS. CLINICAL RSCH. 49
(2013) (describing the use of placebo in clinical trials); Annette Rid, Abha Saxena,
Abdhullah H. Baqui, Anant Bhan, Julie Bines, Marie-Charlotte Bouesseau, Arthur Caplan,
James Colgrove, Ames Dhai, Rita Gomez-Diaz, Shane K. Green, Gagandeep Kang, Rosanna
Lagos, Patricia Loh, Alex John London, Kim Mulholland, Pieter Neels, Punee Pitisuttithum,
Samba Cor Sarr, Michael Selgelid, Mark Sheehan & Peter G. Smith, Placebo Use in Vaccine
Trials: Recommendations of a WHO Expert Panel, 32 VACCINE 4708 (2014) (addressing the
specificities associated with the use of placebo in vaccine clinical trials).
28
Meldrum, supra note 22.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See generally Lee Hampton, Albert Sabin and the Coalition to Eliminate Polio from
the Americas, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 34 (2009) (discussing the oral polio vaccine and mass
vaccinations); Anda Baicus, History of Polio Vaccination, 1 WORLD J. VIROLOGY 108 (2012)
(addressing the eradication of poliomyelitis and the three poliovirus serotypes).
33
See supra note 16 and accompanying text; see also Philip D. Minor, Polio Vaccines
and the Cessation of Vaccination, 2 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 99 (2003) (discussing the
eradication of polio and the difficulties associated with the entire cessation of vaccination);
Ananda S. Bandyopadhyay, Julie Garon, Katherine Seib & Walter A. Orenstein, Polio
Vaccination: Past, Present and Future, 10 FUTURE MICROBIOLOGY 791 (2015) (analyzing
the eradication of the wild polio virus).
34
Polio Elimination in the United States, supra note 17.
35
Id.
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In addition to generating the data necessary to support the licensure of the
vaccine,36 the 1954–55 polio vaccine trials also established the standard now in place
for clinical trials involving all types of pharmaceutical products: randomized
controlled trials.37 But while the polio trials in the United States provided the
blueprint for what would become the global clinical trial standard, it took a major
public health incident in the early 1960s for clinical trials to become mandatory for
new drugs and vaccines entering the market.38
The sedative drug thalidomide, which was administered in several countries
outside the United States in the late 1950s to pregnant women for several conditions,
caused extensive birth defects in children.39 Working as a medical officer at the
FDA, Dr. Frances Kelsey reviewed and rejected the application to market
thalidomide in the United States due to insufficiencies in the information provided
by the sponsor.40 While Dr. Kelsey’s intervention averted what would otherwise
have almost certainly been an enormous public health crisis, the problems associated
with the review of thalidomide by regulatory agencies across the world called
attention to the lacking legal framework governing the approval of new drugs and
vaccines.41
Prior to the 1938 Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), there were no
statutory requirements that drug sponsors submit data demonstrating the safety and
efficacy of the products they intended to bring to market.42 The FDCA established
36

See, e.g., Rebekah H. Griesenauer & Michael S. Kinch, An Overview of FDAApproved Vaccines & Their Innovators, 16 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 1253 (2017) (discussing
the development of immunotherapies); see also Science and the Regulation of Biological
Products, supra note 21.
37
Monto, supra note 25, at 7, 13; see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 3; ROBERT J.
LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH (2d ed. 1988) (collectively
providing an overview of the regulation of clinical research leading to, and including, clinical
trials).
38
See, e.g., Lewis A. Grossman, AIDS Activists, FDA Regulation, and the Amendment
of America’s Drug Constitution, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 687, 695 (2016); Joshua M. Sharfstein,
Crises and Population Health, 96 MILBANK Q. 223 (2018); Sharon B. Jacobs, Crises,
Congress, and Cognitive Biases: A Critical Examination of Food and Drug Legislation in
the United States, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 599, 608–12 (2009) (collectively describing how
the 1961 thalidomide crisis directly led to the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments in the
United States).
39
See generally Jack Botting, The History of Thalidomide, 15 DRUG NEWS & PERSPS.
604 (2002) (analyzing the effects of thalidomide, particularly in connection with birth
defects).
40
Frances Oldham Kelsey: Medical Reviewer Famous for Averting a Public Health
Tragedy, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/virtualexhibits-fda-history/frances-oldham-kelsey-medical-reviewer-famous-averting-publichealth-tragedy [https://perma.cc/PBD7-FQMH].
41
Jacobs, supra note 38, at 609.
42
See SUZANNE WHITE JUNOD, FDA AND CLINICAL DRUG TRIALS: A SHORT HISTORY
1, 5–7 (2016), https://www.fda.gov/media/110437/download [https://perma.cc/G4LZ9S4Q].
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the principle that safety data must be submitted to the FDA before a new drug or
vaccine comes to market by requiring that sponsors conduct “adequate tests by all
methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not the drug is safe.”43 In 1962,
in direct response to the thalidomide crisis, Congress passed the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments to the FDCA, which introduced the requirement that sponsors of new
drugs and vaccines demonstrate that their product is “efficacious” before coming to
market.44 Sponsors were thus required to produce “substantial evidence” of the
effectiveness of a drug or vaccine by presenting data generated through “adequate
and well-controlled studies.”45
While the new law made clinical trials a pre-requisite of market entrance, it did
not define the concepts of “adequate” or “well-controlled” studies, nor did FDA
guidance provide much more information to sponsors immediately after the
Kefauver-Harris Amendments were enacted.46 The legal framework that would
make clinical trials the sine qua non of drug and vaccine approval was nonetheless
in place, and it was incrementally strengthened through legislative and regulatory
interventions in the following decades.47
The clinical trial paradigm applied on a large scale during the 1954–55 polio
vaccine trials and codified in 1962 in the United States quickly became part of the
regulatory frameworks in other countries.48 Randomized controlled trials became

43

Id. at 5.
Id. at 8–12 (noting other measures introduced to strengthen the role of the FDA in
drug review); see also Kefauver-Harris Amendments Revolutionized Drug Development,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Sept. 10, 2012), https://www.fda.gov/consumers/consumerupdates/kefauver-harris-amendments-revolutionized-drug-development [https://perma.cc/
LGH5-WFTJ].
45
See JUNOD, supra note 42, at 11–12.
46
Id. at 12.
47
Id.; Hearing Regulations and Regulations Describing Scientific Content of Adequate
and Well-Controlled Clinical Investigations, 35 Fed. Reg. 7250 (May 8, 1970); Food and
Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296; Food
and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823;
Clinical Trials Guidance Documents, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidance-documents/clinical-trialsguidance-documents [https://perma.cc/G8MU-VJU6].
48
See, e.g., Ulrike Lindner & Stuart S. Blume, Vaccine Innovation and Adoption: Polio
Vaccines in the UK, the Netherlands and West Germany, 1955–1965, 50 MED. HIST. 425
(2006), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1592614/ [https://perma.cc/Y4KASG7K]; Gail A. Van Norman, Drugs and Devices: Comparison of European and U.S.
Approval Processes, 1 JACC: BASIC TO TRANSLATIONAL SCI. 399 (2016),
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2452302X16300638 [https://perma.cc/
C283-2ZC5] (noting similar substantive drug review procedures and standards in the United
States and countries in the European Union in spite of organizational differences between
the FDA and the European Medicines Agency).
44
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known as the “gold standard” in drug and vaccine effectiveness research and have
remained a core component of the scientific and drug review processes ever since.49
B. From Polio to COVID-19 and the Emergence of New Vaccine Technology
March 16, 2020. Kaiser Permanente Washington Research Institute in Seattle.
This date and place marked the beginning of the clinical trials for the first
COVID-19 vaccine candidate.50 Less than nine months later, the FDA authorized
the emergency use of the first COVID-19 vaccines ever developed.51
Several parallels have been drawn between the COVID-19 and the polio
vaccine races, even though more than six decades separate these events.52 In both
cases, an infectious pathogen not fully understood by the scientific community
triggered a major public health crisis, spread fear among the populations most
vulnerable to the disease and their families, and prompted a vaccine race amidst
multiple competitors in different countries, resulting in the development,
manufacturing and distribution of groundbreaking vaccines within extremely
compressed timelines.53
By the time the COVID-19 trials began, however, the legal framework
regulating clinical trials had evolved considerably, both to reflect evolving scientific
notions and to strengthen the protection of clinical trial volunteers.
49

LEVINE, supra note 37 and accompanying text; see also Elliott M. Antman & Barbara
E. Bierer, Standards for Clinical Research: Keeping Pace with the Technology of the Future,
133 CIRCULATION 823, 823 (2016), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4778
966/ [https://perma.cc/WM9N-3KCY].
50
First COVID-19 Vaccine Trial at Kaiser Permanente Washington,
KAISERPERMANENTE.ORG (Mar. 16, 2020), https://about.kaiserpermanente.org/ourstory/health-research/news/first-covid-19-vaccine-trial-at-kaiser-permanente-washington
[https://perma.cc/QY2C-FLRM].
51
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATION OF MEDICAL
PRODUCTS AND RELATED AUTHORITIES: GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND OTHER
STAKEHOLDERS (2017), https://www.fda.gov/regulatory-information/search-fda-guidancedocuments/emergency-use-authorization-medical-products-and-related-authorities [https://
perma.cc/X653-TFDY]; cf. 21 U.S.C. § 360bbb-3 (2017) (statutory authority for emergency
use authorization).
52
See, e.g., David Oshinsky, What the Polio Vaccine Can Teach Us About the Covid19 Vaccine, CNN (Nov. 17, 2020, 11:47 AM ET), https://www.cnn.com/2020/11/17/opin
ions/covid-polio-vaccine-parallels-oshinsky/index.html
[https://perma.cc/GJR6-VD9G];
Arthur Allen, Trust, Fear and Solidarity Will Determine the Success of a COVID Vaccine,
KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Aug. 17, 2020), https://khn.org/news/trust-fear-and-solidarity-willdetermine-the-success-of-a-covid-vaccine/ [https://perma.cc/7SYS-5TXE].
53
Compare Ewen Callaway, The Race for Coronavirus Vaccines: A Graphical Guide,
NATURE (Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01221-y
[https://perma.cc/8H5S-FJJY] (chronicling the early stages of the COVID-19 vaccine race),
with Gilbert King, Salk, Sabin and the Race Against Polio, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 3,
2012),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/salk-sabin-and-the-race-against-polio169813703/ [https://perma.cc/A7LA-DPDV] (chronicling the polio vaccine race).
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While the polio vaccine trials are still hailed by many commentators as a great
achievement in medical research,54 they were also conducted partly in ways that
would constitute a violation of modern ethical principles governing biomedical
research, such as the testing of the vaccine on institutionalized physically and
intellectually disabled children during the early stages of research.55
There were cases of even more extensive ethical violations in medical research
even as clinical trials became progressively more regulated, both in the context of
vaccine research and in other areas. The most well-known example is the Tuskegee
Study, a forty-year federally-funded medical research program (1932–72) conducted
with the purpose of observing the evolution of untreated syphilis in black male
populations, during the course of which several egregious ethical violations were
repeatedly committed.56 These violations included deceptive statements about the
purpose of the study made by researchers to economically disadvantaged
volunteers,57 as well as the intentional deprivation of available treatments to syphilis
patients, which produced detrimental effects to both the health of the individuals
involved in the study and that of their families and communities.58 The repercussions
of the Tuskegee Study are felt to this day, with lower levels of trust in medical
research registered among minority communities being partially connected to the
memory and impact of Tuskegee.59 A study published in 2018—forty-six years after
the end of Tuskegee—found that, in addition to giving rise to medical mistrust
issues, the Tuskegee Study “correlated with increases in . . . mortality and decreases
in both outpatient and inpatient physician interactions for older black men.”60
In the case of vaccine-related research, one of the most prominent examples is
the so-called “experiment” at Willowbrook State School in Staten Island.61
54

See Meier, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
Polio Brochure 1, HISTORY OF VACCINES, https://www.historyofvaccines.org/con
tent/salk-begins-early-polio-vaccine-tests-0 [https://perma.cc/3JXK-W44W] (last visited
Jan. 28, 2021). For further discussion of ethical aspects of the Salk vaccine development and
testing, see generally Howard Markel, April 12, 1955—Tommy Francis and the Salk Vaccine,
352 N. ENG. J. MEDICINE 1408 (2005).
56
See generally Ruqaiijah Yearby, Exploitation in Medical Research: The Enduring
Legacy of the Tuskegee Syphilis Study, 67 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 1171 (2017).
57
Id. at 1172.
58
Id. at 1172–73.
59
Id.; see also Allan M. Brandt, Racism and Research: The Case of the Tuskegee
Syphilis Study, 8 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 21, 27 (1978) (“The degree of deception and damages
have been seriously underestimated.”). See generally HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL
APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (2008) (detailing the history of the exploitation of
Black American populations in medical research before and after Tuskegee).
60
Marcella Alsan & Marianne Wanamaker, Tuskegee and the Health of Black Men,
133 Q.J. ECON 407, 407 (2018).
61
See generally Stephen Goldby, Experiments at the Willowbrook State School, 297
LANCET 749 (1971). But see Saul Krugman, The Willowbrook Hepatitis Studies Revisited:
Ethical Aspects, 8 REVS. INFECTIOUS DISEASE 157 (1986) (offering a defense of the study
design by the lead researcher in the Willowbrook study).
55
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Researchers interested in understanding more about hepatitis C with the eventual
goal of developing a vaccine conducted a non-therapeutic study for roughly fifteen
years (1955/56–71)62 on developmentally disabled children by deliberately infecting
them with the virus and monitoring their progress.63
A Forbes journalist interviewed the mother of one of these children over fifty
years after the Willowbrook study began, and aptly characterized some of the ways
in which parental consent was obtained as a “Faustian bargain”:
In order to get [her severely autistic daughter] a spot at the overcrowded
facility, however, she had to make a Faustian bargain—consenting to
allow her daughter to be part of a quest to find a vaccine for hepatitis. “I
had no choice,” McCourt says, “I had tried so many different places and
so many arrangements, and they didn’t work out, so I went along with it.”64
In response to systemic ethical failures long observed in medical research, and
in particular as a direct response to the publicization of the Tuskegee Study, a code
of conduct known as the Belmont Report was published in the United States in 1979,

62

There are disparities in the reporting of the starting date for the Willowbrook study.
Compare Willowbrook Hepatitis Experiments in EXPLORING BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2009),
https://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/webversions/bioethics/guide/pdf/master_54.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z32F-XN7W] (providing a 1955 starting date), with James M.
DuBois, Hepatitis Studies at the Willowbrook State School for Children with Mental
Retardation, in ETHICS IN MENTAL HEALTH RESEARCH (2008), https://sites.google.com/a/
narrativebioethics.com/emhr/contact/hepatitis-studies-at-the-willowbrook-state-school-forchildren-with-mental-retardation [https://perma.cc/KK4D-2NKA] (providing a 1956
starting date).
63
Trials in which healthy participants are infected with a pathogen are also known as
challenge studies. See, e.g., Annette Rid & Meta Roestenberg, Judging the Social Value of
Controlled Human Infection Studies, 34 BIOETHICS 749, 750 (2020). The topic of challenge
studies has also been discussed in the context of the COVID-19 vaccine race. See, e.g.,
Jeffrey P. Kahn, Leslie Meltzer Henry, Anna C. Mastroianni, Wilbur H. Chen & Ruth
Macklin, For Now, It’s Unethical to Use Human Challenge Studies for SARS-CoV-2 Vaccine
Development, 117 PNAS 28538 (2020), https://www.pnas.org/content/117/46/28538
[https://perma.cc/9KRP-3WTG] (arguing against the use of challenge studies in the COVID19 vaccine race); Seán O’Neill McPartlin, Josh Morrison, Abie Rohrig & Charles Weijer,
Covid-19 Vaccines: Should We Allow Human Challenge Studies to Infect Healthy Volunteers
with SARS-CoV-2, 371 BRIT. MED. J. 4258 (2020) (exploring arguments both in favor and
against challenge studies for COVID-19 vaccines).
64
Leah Rosenbaum, The Hideous Truths of Testing Vaccines on Humans, FORBES,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/leahrosenbaum/2020/06/12/willowbrook-scandal-hepatitisexperiments-hideous-truths-of-testing-vaccines-on-humans/?sh=10e391a4279c [https://
perma.cc/LZK5-N4KH] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021); see also COLEMAN ET AL., supra note 3,
at 40 (describing further the Willowbrook study).
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providing a set of ethical principles and guidelines designed to protect participants
in clinical research.65
The subsequent decades brought about significant changes in the legal
protections offered to participants in biomedical research. Some of these changes
were directly aimed at protecting volunteers participating in clinical trials, as is the
case of laws regulating informed consent, while others protected volunteers
indirectly by focusing on the collection of data during trials and ensuing permissible
uses.
In 1981, the principles enshrined in the Belmont Report became the foundation
of the legal framework governing federal protection of human subjects involved in
clinical research, primarily through the regulation of informed consent.66 In 1991,
they were codified in the Common Rule,67 which was revised in 2018.68
In an attempt to correct asymmetries in data collection, particularly with regard
to the representation of women and racial and ethnic minorities, the NIH
Revitalization Act of 1993 was introduced to mandate appropriate inclusion of
minority volunteers in research funded by the National Institutes of Health.69 As
noted in Section III.A in the context of COVID-19 vaccine trials, problems of underrepresentation of racial and ethnic minorities persist in spite of these legislative
efforts.
65

THE NAT’L COMM’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL
AND BEHAVIORAL RSCH., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, THE BELMONT
REPORT: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS
OF RESEARCH (1979) (establishing the ethical principles of respect for persons, beneficence
and justice, and requiring three elements in connection with informed consent: information,
comprehension and voluntariness); see also Eli Y. Adashi, LeRoy B. Walers & Jerry A.
Menikoff, The Belmont Report at 40: Reckoning with Time, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1345
(2018) (surveying the application of the Belmont Report and emerging issues not
contemplated by the drafters of the Report).
66
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2019).
67
See 45 C.F.R. § 46 (1992) and 21 C.F.R. § 50 (1992) (collectively laying out the
regulatory regime for the protection of human subjects in clinical trials, the former in the
context of federally funded research and the latter in the context of clinical trials overseen
by the FDA).
68
Revised Common Rule, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
https://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/regulations-and-policy/regulations/finalized-revisions-commonrule/index.html [https://perma.cc/4J2H-K8QG] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021); see also Jerry
Menikoff, Julie Kaneshiro & Ivor Pritchard, The Common Rule, Updated, 376 NEW ENG. J.
MEDICINE 613 (2017); Valerie Gutmann Koch & Kelly Todd, Research Revolution or Status
Quo?: The New Common Rule and Research Arising from Direct-to-Consumer Genetic
Testing, 56 HOUS. L. REV. 81 (2018).
69
National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-43, 107
Stat. 22. But see Stacie E. Geller, Abigail R. Koch, Pamela Roesch, Amarette Filut, Emily
Hallgren & Molly Carnes, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: A Study
to Evaluate Compliance with Inclusion and Assessment of Women and Minorities in
Randomized Controlled Trials, 93 ACAD. MED. 630, 630 (2018) (finding that “NIH policies
have not resulted in significant increases in reporting results by sex, race, or ethnicity”).
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As also described in Section III.B, another strand of longstanding problems
affects the collection and dissemination of clinical trial data. On the one hand, not
all clinical trials are registered, a phenomenon that poses significant hurdles to
research transparency and accountability, as well as to access to existing data for
purposes of follow-on innovation.70 On the other hand, even in the case of registered
trials with published results, current industry practices result in the availability of
severely incomplete data, which similarly impairs transparency, accountability and
subsequent research.71
The Declaration of Helsinki, originally adopted in 1964 and last amended in
2018, established that clinical trials must be registered in publicly available
databases,72 and imposed a duty of dissemination of clinical trial results on medical
researchers.73 The United States codified clinical trial reporting requirements
consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki,74 and in 1997 the Food and Drug
Administration Modernization Act (FDAMA) required the registration of clinical
trials for serious or life-threatening diseases and conditions.75 Three years later, the
National Institutes of Health launched a national registry of clinical trials,
Clinicaltrials.gov, hosted by the U.S. National Library of Medicine.76 Registration
requirements for clinical trials were scaled up in 2007 by the Food and Drug
Administration Amendments Act (FDAAA),77 which required the government to
expand the federal clinical trial data bank.78
However, as further detailed in Part III, registration of clinical trials remains far
from uniform.79 There has been very little institutional support within the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) for the enforcement of the trial
registration and data reporting requirements set by FDAMA and FDAAA. In 2016,

70

See infra Section III.B.
Id.
72
WORLD MED. ASS’N, DECLARATION OF HELSINKI: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR
MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS ¶ 35 (2018), https://www.wma.net/polic
ies-post/wma-declaration-of-helsinki-ethical-principles-for-medical-research-involvinghuman-subjects/ [https://perma.cc/GPQ4-7BQR] [hereinafter DECLARATION OF HELSINKI].
73
Id. at ¶ 36.
74
See 42 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2020); Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of
2007, Pub. L. No. 110–85, § 801, 121 Stat. 823, 904.
75
Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, §
113, 111 Stat. 2296, 2310; see also Regulations: Good Clinical Practice and Clinical Trials,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/science-research/clinical-trials-andhuman-subject-protection/regulations-good-clinical-practice-and-clinical-trials [https://per
ma.cc/KS9C-YMGA] (last visited Jan. 28, 2021).
76
CLINICALTRIALS.GOV, https://clinicaltrials.gov [https://perma.cc/JJ75-AH83] (last
visited Jan. 29, 2021).
77
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act § 801.
78
42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(2)(A)(i) (2018).
79
See infra Section III.B.
71
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six years after the statutory deadline,80 the Department of Health and Human
Services issued a final rule implementing the data reporting requirements set forth
in FDAAA.81 The rule, which became effective in January of the following year,
exempted clinical trials82 completed before January 18, 2017, from data reporting
requirements in cases in which the sponsored product had not been approved by the
FDA at the date of completion of the trial.83 In 2020, the District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that the FDAAA unambiguously required
sponsors to submit data and HHS to include it in ClinicalTrials.gov irrespective of
trial completion date or product approval, thus striking down the reporting
exemption.84
Contemporary vaccine clinical trials thus take place against a legal and
normative background that is vastly different from the ones in which the polio
vaccine trials were conducted—albeit one in which profound shortcomings persist
at the participant-representation, registration, data reporting and data sharing levels,
as illustrated by the vaccine-specific examples provided in the following Part.85
Recently, the introduction of new and disruptive vaccine technology has
ratcheted up the challenges posed to the clinical trial ecosystem and the data
infrastructure it generates. After over a decade of study, the COVID-19 vaccine race
provided the final catalyst for late-stage development of a novel type of vaccine:
Messenger RNA (mRNA) vaccines.86 mRNA is a type of genetic material that
contains instructions for the human body to create certain types of proteins.87 In the
case of mRNA vaccines, scientists use a synthetic version of mRNA to direct the
human body to produce some of the same proteins that the virus normally produces,
without actually ever introducing viral matter into the body.88 In response to the
80

See 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3)(D)(i) (2018); see also Complaint at 11, Seife v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Hum. Servs., 440 F. Supp. 3d 254 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (No. 18-cv-11462),
https://law.yale.edu/sites/default/files/area/center/crit/document/01_complaint.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4WQL-MFPH].
81
42 C.F.R. pt. 11 (2020).
82
The rule applies to “primary completion” of clinical trials. See 42 C.F.R. § 11.42(b)
(2020) (stating that “clinical trial results . . . must be submitted for any applicable clinical
trial with a primary completion date on or after January 18, 2017”); 42 C.F.R. § 11.10(a)
(2020) (“Completion date means . . . the date that the final subject was examined or received
an intervention for the purposes of final collection of data for the primary outcome, whether
the clinical trial concluded according to the pre-specified protocol or was terminated.”).
83
42 C.F.R. § 11.42(b) (2020) (exempting trials completed before January 18, 2017).
84
Seife, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 279.
85
See infra Section III.A (surveying participant-representation issues) and Section III.B
(surveying registration, data reporting, and data sharing issues).
86
See, e.g., Understanding and Explaining mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines, supra note 1.
87
Messenger RNA (mRNA), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST., https://www.genome.
gov/genetics-glossary/messenger-rna [https://perma.cc/RT34-3H3L] (last visited Jan. 29,
2021).
88
See generally Jennifer Abbasi, COVID-19 and mRNA Vaccines—First Large Test for
a New Approach, 324 JAMA 1125 (Sept. 3, 2020), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/
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presence of these proteins, the immune system triggers a protective response.89 By
contrast, vaccines available before the pandemic had to rely on small amounts of
viral matter as a way to trigger the same type of response.90
The COVID-19 mRNA vaccine candidates were developed in a matter of
months—faster than COVID-19 vaccines based on older technology could be—
followed by a short period of clinical trials, thus calling for testing a medical
technology never before used in humans.91 Regulators across the world needed to
evaluate data generated under extreme circumstances and decide whether to
authorize the emergency use of vaccines before enough data was gathered for
sponsors to request a full approval of their vaccine candidates.92 As a trade-off for
making critical public health tools available quickly to large segments of the
population, these regulators—including the FDA—eventually granted emergency
use authorizations to the leading COVID-19 vaccine candidates by relying on data
inherently far more limited than the data normally supplied in support of applications
to market new vaccines.93
This Article has so far provided contextual information on the emergence of the
contemporary vaccine clinical trial model, noting longstanding issues in the ways
vaccine-related knowledge is produced in clinical trials and resulting data are
disclosed. These longstanding issues are now combined with challenges to
regulatory review of new vaccines when vaccine data are generated on a timeline
severely compressed by a public health crisis. Part III now focuses on systemic
issues affecting the production and disclosure of vaccine clinical trial data.

fullarticle/2770485 [https://perma.cc/B8UL-FUE6]; Carlo Iavarone, Derek T. O’Hagan,
Dong Yu, Nicolas F. Delahaye & Jeffrey B. Ulmer, Mechanism of Action of mRNA-Based
Vaccines, 16 EXPERT REV. VACCINES 871 (2017); see also The Science and Fundamentals
of mRNA Technology, MODERNA.COM, https://www.modernatx.com/mrna-technology/scien
ce-and-fundamentals-mrna-technology [https://perma.cc/SMH2-UUD8] (last visited Jan.
28, 2021) (including a description of mRNA vaccine technology provided by one of the
sponsors of an mRNA COVID-19 vaccine authorized in the United States in late 2020).
89
See Understanding and Explaining mRNA COVID-19 Vaccines, supra note 1.
90
Id.
91
See Brothers, supra note 2.
92
See EMA Recommends First COVID-19 Vaccine for Authorisation in the EU, EUR.
MEDS. AGENCY (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.ema.europa.eu/en/news/ema-recommendsfirst-covid-19-vaccine-authorisation-eu [https://perma.cc/7C6Z-XCP2]; Statement on the
U.S. Authorization of the Moderna COVID-19 Vaccine, HEALTH CAN. (Dec. 18, 2020),
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/news/2020/12/statement-on-the-us-authorizationof-the-moderna-covid-19-vaccine.html [https://perma.cc/98Z2-ME2B]; FDA Takes Key
Action in Fight Against COVID-19 by Issuing Emergency Use Authorization for First
COVID-19 Vaccine, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-takes-key-action-fight-againstcovid-19-issuing-emergency-use-authorization-first-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/FK7JXLKD] [hereinafter FDA Takes Key Action].
93
See FDA Takes Key Action, supra note 92.
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III. VACCINE CLINICAL TRIAL DATA AS BUILDING BLOCKS
Data generated during vaccine clinical trials are the bedrock of the scientific
and regulatory processes that bring new vaccines to market.94 Yet, the ways in which
those data are produced have long resulted in a data infrastructure marked by gaps
in foundational knowledge related to the development and testing of new vaccines.
This, in turn, has an impact on the intrinsic completeness, accuracy and transparency
of vaccine data collection—and by extension on instrumental uses of those data,
such as the use of clinical trial data to support the approval (or denial) of a new
vaccine—as well as on public perceptions of how vaccines are developed, tested and
made available to populations at large. Section III.A examines these problems from
the perspective of data collection, while Section III.B turns to issues arising in the
data-sharing context.
A. Data Collection: Limitations of the Current Vaccine Clinical Trial Data
Infrastructure
One of the most salient holes in the vaccine data infrastructure stems from the
under-representation of certain segments of the population in vaccine clinical
trials—most notably, minority populations.95 Even though legislation has been
enacted to address participant-representation problems in clinical trials in general,96
minorities have long been underrepresented in clinical trials, both in the United

94

See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Avoiding the TRIPS Trap: A Path to Domestic Disclosure
of Clinical Drug Data Consistent with International Norms, CORNELL INT’L L.J.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 15–18) (on file with author) (linking the availability of
clinical trial data to transparency); Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical
Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a Public Goods
Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 51, 54–58 (2009) (making the case that
treating clinical trial data as a public good would result in long-term follow-on innovation).
95
There are additional categories of populations under-represented in vaccine clinical
trials. Consider the case of pediatric populations during the COVID-19 pandemic: clinical
trials for coronavirus vaccines did not enroll children until late 2020. See, e.g., Jeffrey I.
Campbell, Karen E. Ocwieja & Mari M. Nakamura, A Call for Pediatric COVID-19 Clinical
Trials, 146 PEDIATRICS 1 (2020), https://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/146/2/e2020
1081 [https://perma.cc/D8XX-K2EB]; Denise Grady, Moderna Plans to Begin Testing Its
Coronavirus Vaccine in Children, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/12/02/health/Covid-Moderna-vaccine-children.html [https://perma.cc/S7NL-G3YU].
96
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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States97 and elsewhere.98 For example, researchers have found both problems of
minority under-representation in clinical trial design and a lack of uniformity across
trial sites in the collection and reporting of data on race and ethnicity.99 The
landscape in vaccine clinical trials also reflects this systemic problem. For instance,
an online registry made available early in the pandemic by the COVID-19
Prevention Network to enable individuals to express interest in participating in
COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials had enlisted around 350,000 people by late August
2020, of which around only 10% were Black or Hispanic.100
The conduct of COVID-19 clinical trials further illustrates systemic problems
affecting the participation of racial and ethnic minorities. Consider the cases of the
Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine candidate, which in December 2020 became the first

97
See Paula A. Rochon, Azad Mashari, Ariel Cohen, Anjali Misra, Dara Laxer, David
L. Streiner, Jocalyn P. Clark, Julie M. Dergal & Jennifer Gold, The Inclusion of Minority
Groups in Clinical Trials: Problems of Under Representation and Under Reporting of Data,
11 ACOUNTABILITY IN RSCH: POLICIES & QUALITY ASSURANCE 215, 216 (2004); Barbara A.
Noah, The Participation of Underrepresented Minorities in Clinical Research, 29 AM. J.L.
& MED. 221, 224 (2003); Jill A. Fisher & Corey A. Kalbaugh, Challenging Assumptions
About Minority Participation in US Clinical Research, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 2217, 2217
(2011); Ali Salman, Claire Nguyen, Yi-Hui Lee & Tawna Cooksey-James, A Review of
Barriers to Minorities’ Participation in Cancer Clinical Trials: Implications for Future
Cancer Research, 18 J. IMMIGRANT MINORITY HEALTH 447, 448 (2016); Andrea L. GilmoreBykovskyi, Yuanyuan Jin, Carey Gleason, Susan Flowers-Benton, Laura M. Block, Peggye
Dilworth-Anderson, Lise L. Barnes, Manish N. Shah & Megan Zuelsdorff, Recruitment and
Retention of Underrepresented Populations in Alzheimer’s Disease Research: A Systematic
Review, 5 ALZHEIMER’S & DEMENTIA: TRANSLATIONAL RSCH. & CLINICAL INTERVENTIONS
751, 752 (2019); Bassel Nazha, Manoj Mishra, Rebecca Pentz & Taofeek K. Owonikoko,
Enrollment of Racial Minorities in Clinical Trials: Old Problem Assumes New Urgency in
the Age of Immunotherapy, 39 AM. SOC’Y CLINICAL ONCOLOGY EDUC. BOOK 3, 3 (2019).
98
See, e.g., Mahvash Hussain-Gambles, Karl Atkin & Brenda Leese, Why Ethnic
Minority Groups Are Under-Represented in Clinical Trials: A Review of the Literature, 12
HEALTH & SOC. CARE CMTY. 382, 382 (2004) (discussing minority under-representation in
the United Kingdom).
99
See generally Hala T. Borno, Sylvia Zhang & Scarlett Gomez, COVID-19
Disparities: An Urgent Call for Race Reporting and Representation in Clinical Research, 19
CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS COMMC’NS. 1 (2020), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/artic
les/PMC7391979/ [https://perma.cc/XB93-FSVW] (surveying clinical trials focusing on
products other than vaccines).
100
Carolyn Y. Johnson, Large U.S. Covid-19 Vaccine Trials Are Halfway Enrolled, But
Lag on Participant Diversity, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2020, 1:25 PM MDT),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/08/27/large-us-covid-19-vaccine-trials-arehalfway-enrolled-lag-participant-diversity/ [https://perma.cc/ZT63-T9UF].
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vaccine authorized by the FDA for emergency use,101 and of the Moderna vaccine
candidate, which was the first to enter clinical trials.102
Phase 3 of the clinical trial that produced the data used to support the emergency
use authorization granted to Pfizer/BioNTech was initially designed with a target of
30,000 patients and later expanded.103 On December 14, 2020, Pfizer reported a total
enrollment of 44,863 volunteers in 150 sites across six countries, including the
United States.104 By then, 43,004 volunteers (95.9% of the trial population) had
received the second shot.105 At that point, demographic data from the United States
indicated that 13% of volunteers were Latinx, 10% were Black, 6% were Asian and
1.3% were Native American.106 Although Pfizer’s announcement did not specify this
information at the time, these numbers imply that 69.7% of the volunteers in the
Pfizer/BioNTech vaccine trial in the United States did not belong to racial or ethnic
minorities, for an overall diversity rate of 30.3%.107
Moderna’s vaccine clinical trial, which took place across sites in over twenty
U.S. states,108 drew from a somewhat smaller volunteer pool (30,000 participants)
and displayed a slightly higher diversity rate. Just over a month before submitting
its emergency use authorization application to the FDA, Moderna released a report
on phase 3 trials for its vaccine candidate, which at that point had met its enrollment

101

Letter from Denise M. Hinton, Chief Scientist, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Elisa
Harkins, Regulatory Lead, Pfizer, Inc. (Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.fda.gov/media/144412/
download [https://perma.cc/TR86-3F55].
102
First US Clinical Trial of Covid-19 Vaccine Candidate Begins, CLINICAL TRIALS
ARENA (Mar. 17, 2020), https://www.clinicaltrialsarena.com/news/first-us-covid-19vaccine-trial-moderna/ [https://perma.cc/W9WQ-TFKU]; see also Press Release, Moderna,
Moderna Announces First Participant Dosed in NIH-Led Phase 1 Study of mRNA Vaccine
(mRNA-1273) Against Novel Coronavirus (Mar. 16, 2020), https://investors.modernatx.com
/news-releases/news-release-details/moderna-announces-first-participant-dosed-nih-ledphase-1-study [https://perma.cc/3ED4-6Q9G].
103
See Matthew Herper, Pfizer and BioNTech Announce Plan to Expand Covid-19
Vaccine Trial, STAT (Sept. 12, 2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/09/12/pfizer-andbiontech-announce-plan-to-expand-covid-19-vaccine-trial/ [https://perma.cc/RJ9S-XXLF].
104
Pfizer-BioNTech COVID-19 Vaccine Trial Overview, PFIZER.COM,
https://www.pfizer.com/science/coronavirus/vaccine
[https://perma.cc/V383-PYAS]
[hereinafter Pfizer Trial Overview].
105
Id.; Press Release, Pfizer & BioNTech, Pfizer and BioNTech Announce Publication
of Results from Landmark Phase 3 Trial of BNT162B2 Covid-19 Vaccine Candidate in the
New England Journal of Medicine (Dec. 10, 2020), https://www.pfizer.com/news/pressrelease/press-release-detail/pfizer-and-biontech-announce-publication-results-landmark
[https://perma.cc/ND3E-2SDY] [hereinafter Pfizer & BioNTech Press Release].
106
Pfizer & BioNTech Press Release, supra note 105.
107
See id. (listing U.S.-specific diversity rates for participants in the Pfizer/BioNTech
clinical trial).
108
MODERNA, MODERNA COVE STUDY 6 (2020) https://www.modernatx.com/sites/
default/files/content_documents/2020-COVE-Study-Enrollment-Completion-10.22.20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XES6-ZBJL] (reporting data current through October 21, 2020).
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goal of 30,000 volunteers in several sites across the United States.109 By October 21,
2020, a total of 25,654 participants had received the second dose of the vaccine.110
Demographic data showed that 20% of volunteers were Latinx, 10% were Black or
African American, 4% were Asian, 63% were White, and all other races and
ethnicities accounted for 3% of the trial population.111 These numbers put the
diversity rate almost 7 points above Pfizer/BioNTech’s, at approximately 37%.
Yet neither Moderna nor Pfizer/BioNTech’s goals for diversity enrollment are
satisfactory according to experts.112 In August 2020, Moderna used social media to
promote its “diversity & inclusion” plan for COVID-19 trials, noting that their
vaccine candidate was being tested in “nearly 100 sites with representative
demography.”113 Shortly thereafter, however, the company had to slow down the
enrollment process because it was not able to recruit enough participants from racial
and ethnic minorities.114 Facing similar problems, Pfizer expanded its target
enrollment from 30,000 to 44,000 volunteers.115 Pfizer’s press release specifically
noted that the expansion was driven by the goal to “increase trial population
diversity.”116 In the context of this specific trial, diversity efforts were also focused
on including younger populations in order to garner data on volunteers as young as
age 16, as well as populations with certain conditions, such as chronic HIV and
hepatitis C.117
The examples of Pfizer/BioNTech and Moderna within the context of the
COVID-19 vaccine race are especially relevant given the fact that their vaccine
candidates were the first to enter the United States market, but these companies are
by no means the only ones facing diversity problems in vaccine clinical trials. A
representative for Velocity Clinical Research, an organization involved in COVID19 vaccine trials in multiple locations across the United States,118 reported similar
enrollment problems. The Velocity Clinical Research representative described
109

Moderna’s Fully Enrolled Phase 3 COVE Study of mRNA-1273, MODERNA.COM,
https://www.modernatx.com/cove-study [https://perma.cc/2Z8B-P66B] (last visited Jan. 29,
2021) [hereinafter Moderna’s Phase 3 COVE Study].
110
Id.
111
MODERNA, supra note 108, at 2.
112
See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
113
@moderna_tx, TWITTER (Aug. 21, 2020, 4:51 PM MDT), https://twitter.com/moder
na_tx/status/1296942996592746498 [https://perma.cc/7PJW-G2QA].
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instructions to slow down volunteer recruitment in a way that tersely illustrates the
magnitude of the problem: “Some of our sites, bluntly, are situated in a largely white
population [sic]. We have had sites in those places that were told, ‘You need to stop
now and only recruit from minorities.’”119
Moderna’s data on the progression of clinical trial enrollment follows a similar
recruitment pattern:
800
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400
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Sept.
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Non-White

Figure 1: Moderna COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials enrollment, July 27, 2020
through October 21, 2020
The graph shows that during the first half of the enrollment period, White
participants were being recruited at rates more than double those of non-White
participants.120 And perhaps even more telling, once diversity issues were flagged
and the company began slowing down recruitment, it did not increase diversity by
increasing recruitment rates among non-White populations, but rather by
maintaining rates of non-White recruitment while drastically reducing the
recruitment rate of White participants and eventually bringing it close to a halt.121
Nevertheless, this strategy can scarcely be said to have worked. Consider the
case of enrollment of Black or African American volunteers for the Moderna vaccine
trial. In August, when concerns about diversity in COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials
began being voiced more forcefully,122 the Moderna trial had enrolled only 7% Black
or African American volunteers.123 By mid-September that number had gone up to
13%.124 Yet, as noted above, once enrollment was completed, the overall percentage
of Black participants had dropped to 10%.125 This number—as well as the overall
119
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diversity numbers in COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials—are far from the ones cited
by public health experts as needed to accomplish the intertwined goals of accurately
reflecting the racial and ethnic make-up of the United States and generating more
granular data for purposes of regulatory review and vaccine trust-building.126
The specific demographic burden of COVID-19 makes substantial minority
representation in vaccine clinical trials especially important. Dr. Anthony Fauci—
the director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases—has noted
that, given the disproportionately higher toll of COVID-19 on minorities, clinical
trials for COVID-19 vaccines should enroll a significantly larger percentage of
minority volunteers than other types of trials.127 Dr. Fauci suggested that, in the
specific case of COVID-19 vaccines, minority enrollment should be twice as high
as the percentage of minorities in the United States population.128 Relying on the
most recent U.S. Census Bureau data, Dr. Fauci’s recommendation translates into a
goal of 66.4% minority enrollment in COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials.129 While it
is important that the representation goals articulated by Dr. Fauci are far higher than
the standards typically used in vaccine clinical trials—and are in no way required by
the FDA in assessing vaccine clinical trial data—the point remains that minority
representation remains low as a feature of clinical trials in general, and vaccine
clinical trials in particular. Dr. Fauci’s approach is also not an isolated one. Other
members of the scientific community agree that, given both the historical underrepresentation of minority populations in clinical trials and the burden of COVID19 on minorities, it is necessary to oversample minority populations in vaccine
trials.130
The problem of under-representation is exacerbated by inadequate reporting by
research sponsors about research design for subgroup analysis. The Government
Accountability Office, a non-partisan agency of the United States government,131
issued a report in November 2020 finding that, albeit successful in generating data
on vaccine candidates in record time, the COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials lacked
transparency.132 In particular, the report noted that the sponsors of the clinical trials
provided little information on the collection and analysis of safety and efficacy data
for population subgroups, including racial and ethnic minorities:
126
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[https://perma.cc/C9R57K98].
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id.
130
Johnson, supra note 100.
131
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., https://www.gao.gov/about/ [https://perma.cc
/RR9H-J5EL] (last visited Jan. 29, 2021).
132
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-21-207, FEDERAL EFFORTS ACCELERATE
VACCINE AND THERAPEUTIC DEVELOPMENT, BUT MORE TRANSPARENCY NEEDED ON
EMERGENCY USE AUTHORIZATIONS 5 passim (2020), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-21207.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZL5-DD9R] [hereinafter GAO REPORT].

2021]

VACCINE CLINICAL TRIALS

791

[COVID-19 vaccine] clinical trial protocols provide limited details on
how the vaccine developers will analyze their safety and efficacy data,
specifically for population subgroups (e.g., the elderly, people with
comorbidities, or racial/ethnic groups) or sample sizes needed for such
subgroup analyses. Unless vaccine developers collect sufficient data for a
subgroup analysis, it may not be possible to identify the potential for
different safety or efficacy results for one or more subgroups, even if
vaccine candidates are found safe and effective in the aggregate for the
general population.133
This chronic under-representation of minority populations in vaccine clinical
trials, compounded by a lack of transparency in data collection and subgroup data
reporting, feeds into larger vaccine trust problems, explored in Section II.B. These
trust problems contribute to vaccine hesitancy, leading individuals indicated for a
vaccine to forego vaccination, sometimes even in cases in which the vaccine can be
administered at no direct cost to the patient.134 But addressing the trust problem
requires overcoming other types of systemic disparities in racial and ethnic
representation that pervade the vaccine development and distribution ecosystem.
Minorities’ mistrust of medical research and the ways in which clinical trials
have been conducted goes far beyond the domain of COVID-19 vaccines. For
example, a study following the administration of H1N1 vaccines in Los Angeles
County at free vaccination clinics during the 2009 swine flu pandemic found “[w]ide
racial/ethnic disparities in vaccination rates,” especially among Black
populations.135 Outside the context of pandemic vaccines, data gleaned over the
years from seasonal flu vaccination provide a useful glimpse into disparities in
vaccine distribution and access.136 Vaccination rates among adult populations have
historically been lower among Black, Hispanic, and American Indian or Alaska

133

Id. at 17.
See, e.g., Rueben C. Warren, Lachlan Forrow, David Augustin Hodge & Robert D.
Truog, Trustworthiness Before Trust—Covid-19 Vaccine Trials and the Black Community,
383 NEW ENG. J. MEDICINE e121(1) (2020); William Wan, Coronavirus Vaccines Face Trust
Gap in Black and Latino Communities, Study Finds, WASH. POST (Nov. 23, 2020, 5:55 PM
MST),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/11/23/covid-vaccine-hesitancy/
[https://perma.cc/EEG5-V25H].
135
Alonzo Plough, Benjamin Bristow, Jonathan Fielding, Stephanie Caldwell & Sinan
Khan, Pandemics and Health Equity: Lessons Learned from the H1N1 Response in Los
Angeles County, 17 J. PUB. HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 20 (2011).
136
See, e.g., Samantha Artiga, Josh Michaud, Jennifer Kates & Kendal Orgera, Racial
Disparities in Flu Vaccination: Implications for COVID-19 Vaccination Efforts, KAISER
FAMILY FOUND. (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.kff.org/policy-watch/racial-disparities-fluvaccination-implications-covid-19-vaccination-efforts/ [https://perma.cc/GWQ8-GRPG].
134

792

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Native populations than among White populations.137 The lower rates are
attributable to multiple factors, including lower insurance rates and logistical
hurdles.138 However, trust deficits in the healthcare system and in medical research
leading to the commercialization of new vaccines—and, more broadly,
pharmaceutical products in general—remain a contributing factor in lower vaccine
uptake among minority communities.139
Mistrust in the process leading to the commercialization of COVID-19
vaccines—both in the clinical trials and FDA review of clinical trial data, as
explained in Section II.B—led to the announcement that entities were forming task
forces or panels to perform ad hoc reviews of any COVID-19 vaccines authorized
or approved by the FDA.140 Notably, the entities do not play a role in drug regulation
in the United States.
Responding to concerns about both minority under-representation and FDA
review of COVID-19 vaccines, the National Medical Association (NMA)
announced the creation of a task force composed of Black doctors to review COVID19 vaccines and drugs.141 The National Medical Association is a professional and
scientific organization founded in 1895 to respond to problems posed by Jim Crow
laws and other mechanisms of racial segregation leading to the disenfranchisement
of Black Americans.142 It began “representing African American physicians and
health professionals in the United States” at a time in which membership in the
American Medical Association was denied to non-White physicians,143 and today it
represents over 50,000 Black physicians.144 In August 2020, the NMA approved a
resolution to create a COVID-19 taskforce, which included doctors affiliated with
federal public health institutions at the core of the response to COVID-19, like the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). The task force also involved
members from the vaccine advisory group responsible for federal vaccination
137
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recommendations (the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, or ACIP),
as well as representatives of medical professional organizations, such as the
Infectious Disease Society of America and the Pediatric Infectious Disease
Society.145 The task force was charged with helping “address questions and concerns
about efficacy, safety, and allocation of COVID-19 vaccines and therapeutics.”146
The NMA specifically framed the formation of the task force as prompted by
concerns that diminishing “public trust in the FDA [ ] will adversely affect
participation in clinical trials, especially in the African-American community.”147
The NMA’s taskforce was not the only instance in which players normally
extraneous to the FDA’s drug and vaccine review process announced interventions
designed to act as a check on FDA review of COVID-19 clinical trial data. In late
September 2020, citing politicization of the review of COVID-19 vaccine clinical
trial data, the governor of New York announced that the state would independently
review any COVID-19 vaccines approved by the FDA before allowing them to be
distributed across the state.148 In October 2020, the governor of California
announced the formation of the California COVID-19 Scientific Safety Review
Workgroup, formed by “California physician scientists” to “independently review
the safety and efficacy of any vaccine that receives FDA approval for
distribution.”149 And in October 2020, the states of Washington, Oregon and Nevada
joined California’s Review Workgroup.150 Although the Review Workgroup
eventually endorsed the COVID-19 vaccine sponsored by Pfizer/BioNTech to which
the FDA granted the first vaccine emergency use authorization,151 the formation of
multiple state-level bodies charged with reviewing FDA vaccine authorizations
speaks to the overall trust deficit in the United States in connection with vaccine
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clinical trials—at least within the context of accelerated data production and
regulatory review of vaccines as a major public health crisis unfolds.
It is possible, indeed probable, that some of the factors that contributed to
distrust of emerging COVID-19 vaccines are specific to the ways in which the
federal response to pandemic preparedness was perceived as defective by the general
public and abundantly criticized by public health experts.152 As such, some of the
events that colored public perceptions of COVID-19 vaccines are likely to remain
idiosyncratic to the current pandemic. Yet, vaccine trust deficits have long been
partly rooted in public perceptions of how vaccine clinical trial data is generated and
assessed. In addition to affecting the scientific and regulatory processes,
longstanding holes in the vaccine data infrastructure resulting from the undercollection of information relative to minority populations pose challenges to vaccine
trust. Absent more forceful corrective interventions, these trust issues that have longcharacterized vaccine research and development will persist beyond the COVID-19
pandemic.
B. Data Sharing: Enabling Scrutiny and Subsequent Innovation
Even if imperfectly collected, data generated during vaccine clinical trials
provide valuable clues not only to regulatory entities exercising their gatekeeping
functions, but also to the scientific community and, ultimately, the public at large.153
However, not all data collected during vaccine clinical trials can be scrutinized or
used for subsequent research endeavors. On the one hand, there has long been
evidence of significant under-reporting of data gathered during vaccine clinical
trials.154 On the other, data that is disclosed in a specific context may be treated as
secret or proprietary vis-à-vis third parties. In the latter case, the most common
scenario involves clinical trial data disclosed to a regulatory agency in connection
with an application to market a new vaccine.155 Together, these two types of
restrictions erect significant hurdles to the free flow of data and scientific knowledge
about newly developed vaccines.
As far as the reporting and publication of vaccine clinical trial data is
concerned, law and practice have long been poorly aligned. As seen above, the
Declaration of Helsinki established that medical researchers have a duty to make the
results of studies involving human subjects publicly available.156 Yet, studies have
repeatedly found that the results of vaccine clinical trials are routinely published
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after a considerable delay, and in many cases are not published at all.157 These two
phenomena have been documented when a pandemic compresses vaccine
development and testing timelines, as well as outside the context of pandemics or
other highly disruptive public health crises.158
The case of vaccine clinical trial data generated during the 2009 H1N1 swine
flu pandemic is instructive. The H1N1 vaccines were developed on a timeline that
was even more compressed than the timeline for the first COVID-19 vaccines: the
strain of influenza that caused the 2009 pandemic was identified in April and the
FDA approved four H1N1 vaccines in September of the same year.159 Yet
publication of clinical trial data lagged considerably. Of the 73 vaccine trials that
took place between 2009 and 2010, only 21 had published data by June 2011, almost
two years after FDA approval of the vaccines.160 This represents less than one-third
(29%) of the trial universe for vaccine candidates developed and tested in a situation
of heightened public health need.161 The results of most H1N1 vaccine clinical trials
remained unpublished.162
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The same is true outside the context of pandemics.163 A study conducted by
Lamberto Manzoli and colleagues surveyed 384 randomized vaccine clinical trials
enrolling over 404,758 participants.164 In addition to surveying H1N1 vaccine
clinical trials, this study included vaccines developed and tested outside pandemic
contexts: human papillomavirus, meningococcal, pneumococcal, and rotavirus
vaccines.165 The study found that, on average, only half of vaccine clinical trials
were published after a median of 26 months from completion of the trial.166
Publication was defined as cases in which “one or more of the main outcomes
appeared in a peer reviewed journal, either online or in print.”167 Almost two-thirds
of the participant data in randomized vaccine clinical trials was not published in
peer-reviewed literature.168
Delayed publication and lack of publication of vaccine clinical trial data
produce detrimental effects that extend beyond the context of subsequent
research.169 As Kay Dickersin and Drummond Rennie noted in a 2003 study
evaluating the implementation of the clinical trial registration requirements
introduced by the 1997 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act: “if the
knowledge gained [through clinical trials] is never reported, the trust between
patients and investigators and that between patients and research ethics review
boards are both damaged.”170
In addition to these problems, segments of the vaccine data infrastructure often
remain inaccessible to many players in the vaccine innovation ecosystem—from
researchers to follow-on innovators in biopharma to activists in the health space—
for relatively long periods of time. These cases encompass situations in which data
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collected during vaccine clinical trials have been reported and submitted for
independent review, but are not made available outside the regulatory context.171
Sponsors of drugs and vaccines are required to submit data to regulatory
agencies across the world in standardized ways in the form of clinical study reports
(CSR).172 These reports tend to contain more data than what is disclosed through
other channels, such as publication in peer-review literature.173 However, not all the
information contained in the clinical study reports submitted by drug and vaccine
sponsors to regulatory entities is made publicly available.174 As further detailed in
Part IV, the European drug regulator has in recent years taken steps to promote the
disclosure of both CSR data and information often not contained in clinical study
reports, as is the case of individual patient data.175
In the United States, the FDA has long treated most of the data submitted by
sponsors—including vaccine data—as proprietary or quasi-proprietary, either by
virtue of existing legal frameworks regulating trade secrecy and other types of
confidential information, or under the FDA’s expansive approach to the concept of
protected data.176
Data submitted to the FDA that qualifies as a trade secret cannot be disclosed
by the agency.177 The law defines a trade secret as “any commercially valuable plan,
formula, process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or
processing of trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either
innovation or substantial effort.”178 Disclosure of data protected as a trade secret by
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an officer or employee of the FDA is punishable by a fine and removal from office
or employment, and may result in imprisonment for up to a year.179
The prohibition on disclosure extends to commercial and financial information
deemed “privileged or confidential,” which the law defines as “valuable data or
information which is used in one’s business and is of a type customarily held in strict
confidence or regarded as privileged and not disclosed to any member of the public
by the person to whom it belongs.”180
Clinical trial data has long been treated by the FDA as proprietary information,
and specifically as a trade secret. The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) in
section 331(j) prevents the FDA from disclosing “any method or process” that
qualifies as a trade secret.181 In regulations issued in the 1970s, the Agency
determined that “safety and effectiveness data for new drugs . . . fall within the trade
secrets exemption and thus are not available for public disclosure[,]” a position it
has maintained ever since.182
Several legal commentators, however, have disagreed with the FDA’s
interpretation of section 331(j) in the FDCA. Rebecca Eisenberg has made the case
that “it is by no means obvious from the statutory language that ‘any method or
process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection’ includes data from clinical
trials.”183 Christine Galbraith has noted that some of the defining characteristics of
clinical trials make them a poor fit for trade secrecy frameworks: “A fundamental
tenet of trade secret law is that protection exists only as long as the information is
kept confidential. The very nature of a clinical trial is quite public in many respects,
making maintenance of complete secrecy fairly difficult.”184 And Arti Rai has
argued that the passage of the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 further eroded the FDA’s
policy stance on clinical trial data by setting up a pathway for the approval of generic
drugs that allows for FDA disclosure of data to follow-on innovators or the public
in general, as long as the period of regulatory exclusivities attached to the reference
drug has expired.185
In addition to the ongoing debate about the FDA’s interpretation of the legal
status of data submitted by drug and vaccine sponsors seeking market authorization,
the mere existence of a filing of an investigational new drug application (IND) for a
179
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biologic—the regulatory category vaccines belong to—cannot be disclosed or
acknowledged by the FDA.186 And even in the cases of information disclosed by
sponsors as part of a submission to clinical trial registries, that information is not
standardized, effectively allowing companies often to provide vague information.187
While the FDA announced some changes in connection with the authorization
and approval of COVID-19 drugs and vaccines,188 a report issued by the
Government Accountability Office in November 2020 found that, at least in the case
of COVID-19 therapeutic products, the FDA had not always been transparent in
disclosing data supporting emergency authorizations for non-vaccine products
“because the agency has not uniformly disclosed information from its scientific
review of the safety and effectiveness data at the time of each authorization.”189
Similarly, some problems related to timely disclosure of information or data were
reported in connection with COVID-19 vaccine clinical trials.190 For example,
Pfizer—the first vaccine sponsor to receive an emergency use authorization in the
United States—was criticized for allegedly delaying the amended vaccine clinical
trial protocol.191 And another pharmaceutical company, AstraZeneca, was criticized
for being too slow to share negative results from its COVID-19 vaccine candidate
clinical trials.192
Recently, other jurisdictions have adopted measures designed to increase
transparency and access to both clinical trial data and other types of information
relative to new drugs and vaccines.193 The next Part surveys an example of a data
186
21 C.F.R. § 601.50(a) (2020); see also id. § 601.50(c) (carving out an exception for
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187
See Deborah A. Zarin, Nicholas C. Ide, Tony Tse, William R. Harlan, Joyce C. West
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2116–17 (2007); see also Miller et al., supra note 157 (further describing transparency issues
in the reporting of clinical trial data).
188
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policy adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic by one of these jurisdictions as a
blueprint for implementing measures that mitigate some of the problems—albeit
only on the data disclosure side—of the vaccine data infrastructure.
IV. TOWARDS A RICHER VACCINE CLINICAL TRIAL DATA INFRASTRUCTURE
So far, this Article has highlighted some of the most salient and longstanding
problems affecting the vaccine clinical trial data infrastructure. It has also surveyed
some of the legislative efforts adopted from the mid-twentieth century onwards to
improve the ways in which vaccine clinical trial data is both collected and shared.
The shortcomings of current frameworks, however, indicate that further action
continues to be necessary on these two fronts.
Many of the interventions required to address the systemic problems explored
throughout this Article will necessarily have to occur on prolonged timelines, and
require concerted efforts from different players in the vaccine development and
deployment ecosystem. For example, addressing overall under-representation issues
in vaccine clinical trials implies tackling intertwined yet fundamentally different
problems. These problems include logistical hurdles ranging from transportation and
childcare arrangements for trial participants to existing implicit biases against racial
and ethnic minority patients held by a majority of healthcare providers,194 just to
name a few areas. Moreover, efforts to improve the representation of racial and
ethnic minorities in vaccine clinical trials cannot be detached from efforts needed in
connection with the under-representation of minorities in clinical trials involving
other medical products.
But while improving vaccine clinical trial data collection and sharing remains
a long-term, multi-prong proposition, there are some more immediate fixes available
to regulators and policymakers that would enrich the vaccine clinical data
infrastructure. As the COVID-19 pandemic exposed some of the holes in this
infrastructure, it also provided the impetus for institutional players like the European
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Medicines Agency (EMA) and the FDA to respond to ongoing vaccine data-related
problems, particularly with regard to the disclosure of clinical trial data.
Following years of criticism for lack of transparency of its clinical trial data
sharing policy,195 the EMA started publishing clinical trial data submitted by drug
and vaccine sponsors in 2016 as part of an effort to render the regulatory review
process more transparent.196 The amount of information made publicly available by
the Agency under this new policy vastly surpassed its previous practices, as well as
the standard at the FDA.197 For each drug or vaccine application, the new policy
mandated the disclosure of the clinical overview of the product, the clinical
summary, study reports associated with individual clinical studies, the study
protocol, the sample case report form used to record information on an individual
patient, and information on the statistical methods employed to evaluate the data
collected during clinical trials.198
Nevertheless, the EMA suspended this new data disclosure policy in December
2018, shortly before relocating from London to Amsterdam in the wake of the Brexit
vote.199 While the Agency committed to reinstating the policy after the move was
completed, it announced a delay in 2020 citing the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic
as the cause.200 As of January 2021 the policy remains suspended.201 However,
195
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during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic there were repeated calls for the
Agency to share more information about clinical trial data submitted in connection
with applications for COVID-19 drugs and vaccines.202 In response, in May 2020
the EMA announced the adoption of an ad hoc data policy for COVID-19 products,
including vaccines.203 The ad hoc policy restored not only the publication of clinical
trial data for approved COVID-19 products, but also the expedited and increased
disclosure of other types of information about experimental and approved COVID19 products.204 For example, the additional information now made available for
COVID-19 products includes the expedited publication of product applications and
assessment reports, as well as the disclosure of information that the EMA does not
typically share under its standard policy, such as the publication of the full body of
the risk management plan for a given product instead of the publication of only the
summary of the plan.205 In the specific case of vaccines, the EMA began publishing
monthly safety updates for approved COVID-19 vaccines, something it does not do
with other types of vaccines under the standard data policy.206 Moreover, the Agency
is also releasing additional safety information about vaccines on an ad hoc basis.207
The following chart summarizes some of the main changes between the
standard policy and the COVID-19 ad hoc policy adopted by the EMA.

202
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Figure 2: EMA’s Standard Data Policy Versus COVID-19 Data Policy210
The quick adoption of the COVID-19 ad hoc data policy by the EMA shows
how regulators can be more responsive to informational and transparency deficits in
the vaccine data infrastructure—and to similar deficits affecting other types of
medical products. This responsiveness is especially critical in the case of emerging
vaccines. As seen in Part II.B, one of the most significant features of the COVID-19
vaccine race is that, unlike research and development focused on other COVID-19
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medical products, it relies on a form of technology that, although studied for over a
decade, is essentially new.211 Cutting-edge science, follow-on improvements and
perceptions of medical products resulting from these scientific processes are all
predicated on a robust and transparent flow of information and data. Moving
forward, the data policy adopted by the EMA for COVID-19 products can and
should be regarded as a starting point towards the building of a richer and more
transparent data infrastructure.
To be sure, the steps taken by the EMA to increase data disclosure during the
pandemic happened on the heels of a policy suspension that greatly decreased the
amount of information available about drugs, vaccines and other medical products
outside the COVID-19 space.212 Although this suspension is meant to be temporary,
it also calls attention to the difficulties regulators face in broadening the disclosure
of clinical trial data and other types of drug- and vaccine-related information. While
the EMA’s policy suspension appears to have been at least partly rooted in its
adjustment to Brexit, there are hurdles that are more generalizable to drug regulators
across the world. As Cynthia Ho has recently pointed out, efforts to increase data
disclosure by national regulatory agencies often bring data-related debates into the
realm of intellectual property negotiations, which in turn fall back on trade law
channels to resolve international disputes, thus complicating the political economy
of this area.213
Finally, it is important to note that the solution surveyed here addresses only
one subset of problems in the vaccine data infrastructure. On their own, efforts to
improve disclosure frameworks leave data generation, collection and publication
problems untouched. This Article has highlighted a range of shortcomings in the
vaccine data infrastructure related to the production of data about new vaccines, and
concludes by pointing towards an existing example of the implementation of
measures that address one of these shortcomings. Certainly, many other
improvements are still necessary in the area of data disclosure alone, beginning with
the adoption of more permanent data policies in Europe and, hopefully, beyond. Yet,
amidst the pressures posed by the pandemic on the scientific and regulatory
communities, the adoption of the COVID-19 data policy at the EMA shows a path
forward.
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